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Background. Being physically assaulted is known to increase the risk of the occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) symptoms but it may also skew judgements about the intentions of other people. The objectives of the study were
to assess paranoia and PTSD after an assault and to test whether theory-derived cognitive factors predicted the persist-
ence of these problems.
Method. At 4 weeks after hospital attendance due to an assault, 106 people were assessed on multiple symptom
measures (including virtual reality) and cognitive factors from models of paranoia and PTSD. The symptom measures
were repeated 3 and 6 months later.
Results. Factor analysis indicated that paranoia and PTSD were distinct experiences, though positively correlated.
At 4 weeks, 33% of participants met diagnostic criteria for PTSD, falling to 16% at follow-up. Of the group at the ﬁrst
assessment, 80% reported that since the assault they were excessively fearful of other people, which over time fell
to 66%. Almost all the cognitive factors (including information-processing style during the trauma, mental defeat,
qualities of unwanted memories, self-blame, negative thoughts about self, worry, safety behaviours, anomalous internal
experiences and cognitive inﬂexibility) predicted later paranoia and PTSD, but there was little evidence of differential
prediction.
Conclusions. Paranoia after an assault may be common and distinguishable from PTSD but predicted by a strikingly
similar range of factors.
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Introduction
What are the potential psychological consequences
of being physically assaulted? It is well recognized
that a signiﬁcant minority of people develop post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (e.g. Kessler et al.
1995; Kleim et al. 2007; Darves-Bornoz et al. 2008).
Less discussed is that an assault is likely to raise
fears about the intentions of other people. Thoughts
that other people are trying to harm you that are
exaggerated or unfounded can be considered
paranoid (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Thus, being
assaulted may understandably skew thinking in a
paranoid direction. Consistent with this view, a num-
ber of cross-sectional studies in recent years have
shown associations between being victimized, PTSD
symptoms, and current persecutory ideation (e.g.
Campbell & Morrison, 2007; Gracie et al. 2007). For
example, an analysis of a national epidemiological
survey found very strong associations of a probable
diagnosis of PTSD with paranoid thinking, with an
odds ratio of 3.5 for mild paranoia and an odds
ratio of 27 for strong paranoia (Freeman et al. 2011).
In this report we investigate for the ﬁrst time: the
occurrence of paranoia and PTSD longitudinally in
the months immediately after an assault; how dis-
tinguishable paranoia is from PTSD; and, drawing
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upon cognitive models, the factors that lead each to
persist over time.
Understanding PTSD
One perspective on understanding negative reactions
to traumatic events such as an assault is provided by
the PTSD model of Ehlers & Clark (2000). The central
idea is that PTSD occurs when a trauma leads to
a sense of current threat. The feelings of threat are
hypothesized to arise from a combination of a poorly
elaborated and uncontextualized emotional memory
of the event that is easily triggered into consciousness
and a range of related catastrophizing appraisals
about the self or the world. Crucially, the way that
the trauma is processed at the time – in particular, a
reliance on data-driven processing (focusing on
sensory impressions) – contributes to the likelihood
of intrusive memories. The intrusive memories lead
to appraisals of ongoing external or internal threat.
Mental defeat at the time of the assault, the perceived
loss of psychological autonomy, can set the tone of
the future negative thoughts about the self in relation
to the trauma. Importantly, the person with persistent
PTSD tries to control or minimize the sense of threat,
but with unhelpful strategies. For example, avoidance
and other safety behaviours prevent the person learn-
ing that their catastrophic appraisals are inaccurate.
Rumination keeps the trauma and unhelpful apprai-
sals in the person’s mind and prevents them from
moving on with their lives, and attempts to suppress
upsetting memories of the trauma lead to them
bouncing back.
Understanding paranoia
The paranoia spectrum that we have been studying
comprises ideas of reference and of persecution. Our
theoretical understanding has been inﬂuenced by
models of anxiety disorders, since cognitions of current
threat are clearly central to both experiences (Freeman
et al. 2002). Affective processes, especially anxiety,
worry, negative beliefs about the self and interpersonal
sensitivity, are given a central role in this paranoia
model. It is hypothesized that the individual ex-
periences a changed (and confusing) anomalous
internal state (e.g. perceptual disturbances occur).
This may be triggered by, for example, life events, difﬁ-
culties with sleep, or illicit drugs. In essence, the per-
son feels different and this needs an explanation.
Importantly, a negative affective state makes a threa-
tening interpretation likely: anxiety leads to the antici-
pation of danger; negative beliefs about the self and
interpersonal sensitivity highlight the person’s vulner-
ability to harm; and engagement in worry results
in more negative, implausible ideas. The fears reach
a delusional level of conviction when reasoning biases,
such as belief inﬂexibility and jumping to conclusions,
are present. Many of the same processes contribute to
the persistence of the paranoid fears. These include,
just as for anxiety disorders, maladaptive attempts to
reduce the threat such as safety behaviours, thought
suppression, worry and rumination. For example, indi-
viduals with persecutory delusions may not travel on
a bus for fear of attack and therefore fail to learn that
they were safer than they had realized.
Current study
One method used to test models of PTSD has been the
longitudinal investigation of individuals in the months
after a trauma (e.g. Dunmore et al. 2001; Halligan et al.
2003; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). We used this method
to study both paranoia and PTSD after individuals
had attended hospital following injuries received in
an assault. The individuals were also initially assessed
for factors predictive of PTSD from the model of Ehlers
& Clark (2000) and factors predictive of paranoia from
the model of Freeman et al. (2002) and then followed
up over the following 6 months. We were mindful
of what has been termed ‘the paranoia problem’
(Freeman, 2008), the difﬁculty of determining whether
persecutory ideation is unfounded. This difﬁculty is
obviously exacerbated in individuals who have just
been victimized, who may understandably be in fear
of a repeated attack. Therefore in our assessment of
paranoia we: explicitly excluded thoughts concerning
the perpetrator of the assault; used self-report and
interviewer-rated methods; assessed for paranoid
responses that the person acknowledged as exagger-
ated; assessed associated but different phenomena
(ideas of reference); and also used a virtual reality
experimental method. This is arguably the most de-
tailed battery of paranoia measures used in a study.
Study hypotheses
In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 4th edition, text revision (DSM-IV-TR)
description of PTSD it is noted that ‘persecutory idea-
tion can be present in some severe and chronic cases’
(APA, 2000). In contrast, we hypothesized that persec-
utory ideation is relatively common in people after an
assault, and especially common in those with PTSD
reactions. We expected raised rates of paranoia to be
apparent across all forms of our assessment battery,
and hence that reports of paranoia from the self-report,
interviewer and experimental methods of assessment
would be positively correlated. It was hypothesized
that reports of PTSD and paranoia symptoms would
be separable, distinct experiences, as tested by factor
analysis; that is, paranoia would not simply be
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a symptom of PTSD, nor PTSD simply a reaction to
paranoid experiences. The strongest element of assault
studies is the longitudinal design. We hypothesized
that paranoia and PTSD would share many of the
same predictors (e.g. worry, insomnia, interpersonal
sensitivity, safety behaviours), since perceptions of
threat are central to both experiences. However, we
also expected there to be differential predictors of the
two experiences. Perceptual anomalies were hypo-
thesized to be one of two key differential predictors.
In the context of an individual feeling anxious,
the additional occurrence of odd internal perceptual
experiences would lead to delusional ideas via a
sense of ‘things not seeming right’. Perceptual
anomalies are commonly reported by patients with
schizophrenia (e.g. Bunney et al. 1999; Parnas et al.
2003), often considered to be a product of core cogni-
tive dysfunction underlying psychosis (e.g. Maher,
1988; Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007), and have been
found in two virtual reality studies to be differential
predictors of the occurrence of paranoid ideation and
social anxiety (Freeman et al. 2005, 2008a). In contrast,
it was hypothesized that how the trauma was
processed at the time, and consequent disorganized
memories of the event, would be particularly linked
to PTSD symptoms. Disturbance in autobiographical
memory of the traumatic event is considered a core
feature of PTSD (e.g. Foa et al. 1995; Brewin et al.
1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
Method
Participants
A total of 106 individuals were recruited to the study.
The inclusion criteria were: experienced a distressing
assault within the previous month; attended the
Accident and Emergency (A&E) Department at
King’s College Hospital, London for related injuries;
were aged 18–65 years; and could attend a baseline
assessment between 4 and 6 weeks after the assault.
The main exclusion criteria were: the assault was part
of on-going abuse; a history of diagnosed severe
mental illness (schizophrenia spectrum disorders or
bipolar disorder); diagnosed alcohol or drug depen-
dence; and insufﬁcient command of English so that
the assessments could not be completed. The study
was called ‘Reactions to an Assault’ and participants
were informed that:
Every year several thousand people pass through the
Accident and Emergency Department after an assault. This
study concerns reactions to the assault over the next six
months. We want to ﬁnd out how many people have difﬁ-
culties coping with the incident (e.g. remain distressed by it)
and how many people are relatively unaffected by the
incident (e.g. rarely think about it). Importantly, we
want to identify the factors that may lead to the different
reactions.
That the speciﬁc focus was upon paranoia and PTSD
was not explained until the end of the study in order
not to bias the sample during recruitment and testing.
Recruitment took place prospectively over 12
months and a detailed record was kept. Using the
hospital computer records, all the A&E attendees
recorded as having been assaulted, within the correct
age range, were written to and then contacted by tele-
phone. In the course of the year 1482 people attended
the A&E department following an assault; of these, 851
people had working contact details, and 426 people
were successfully reached by telephone (there were at
least four attempts to reach individuals at the contact
numbers). A total of 175 people were uninterested in
the study, 75 people were ineligible, and 176 people
agreed to take part. In all, 106 people attended
the baseline assessment and 70 people did not attend
the arranged appointment. The hospital records had
information on the age and sex of the A&E attendees,
and therefore it was possible to compare the group
tested with the non-participants. Overall, the group
tested did not signiﬁcantly differ from those 1376
hospital attendees who were not tested either in
sex (χ2(1) = 2.52, p=0.112), or in age (t1480 =−1.65,
p=0.100).
Broadly, the types of assault experienced were con-
frontations (n=33) (e.g. the person tried to break up a
ﬁght but got punched and jumped on), random attacks
(n=24) (e.g. the person was walking down the street
when hit from behind and attacked by a group of
boys), muggings (n=22) (e.g. on the way home from
work, a man grabbed the person’s bag, and the victim
did not let go and was then punched), one-off attacks
from familymember or friends (n=19) (e.g. an argument
with a friend led to being attacked) and attacks in the
context of work (n=8) (e.g. support worker attacked
by boy being looked after). All participants reported
sustaining injuries during the assault. Injuries reported
included minor cuts/bruises (n=59), major cuts/bruises
(n=71), unconsciousness (n=7), broken bones (n=28),
head injuries (n=31), injuries to internal organs (n=4),
facial injuries/scars (n=45), stab wounds (n=1), and
other injuries such as broken teeth (n=29). The clear
majority of participants had injuries in two or more of
these injury categories; only 19 people (12.9%) reported
injuries in just one category. A total of four people
reported only minor cuts and bruises.
Assessments
The study variables are summarized in Table 1. For the
assessment of paranoia and PTSD we used self-report,
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interviewer, and experimental methods. Paranoia was
assessed at baseline with the: Green et al. Paranoid
Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al. 2008); positive
items of the Positive and Negative Symptom Scale
(PANSS; Kay, 1991); the Psychotic Symptoms Rating
Scale – delusions (PSYRATS; Haddock et al. 1999);
and four visual analogue 0–100 scales (VAS) (‘Since
the assault, I feel suspicious of other people’, ‘Since
Table 1. Summary of the study measures
Variable Measure
PTSD
PTSD severity (self-report) Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS)
PTSD severity (interviewer) PTSD Symptom Scale (PSSI)
PTSD diagnosis (interviewer) Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Triggered PTSD symptoms (virtual reality) Virtual Reality PTSD Scale
Paranoia
Paranoia severity – ideas of reference (self-report) Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS) – part A
Paranoia severity – persecution (self-report) GPTS – part B
Paranoia total (self-report) GPTS – part A and B
Paranoia severity (self-report) Four visual analogue scales
Paranoia (interviewer) Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS)
Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale (PSYRATS)
Triggered paranoia (virtual reality) State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS)
Processing during trauma
Perceived threat to life during trauma Thoughts and Feelings During the Assault Scale
Negative emotions during trauma Thoughts and Feelings During the Assault Scale
Mental defeat during trauma Mental Defeat Scale
Cognitive processing during the assault
(data-driven processing, lack of self-referent
processing and dissociation)
Cognitive Processing Questionnaire (State Dissociation Scale;
Data-Driven Processing Scale; Lack of Self-Referent
Processing Scale)
Trauma memory
Memory disorganization Trauma Memory Questionnaire
Characteristics of unwanted memories Intrusions Qualities Questionnaires
Post-trauma responses
Cognitive responses to trauma memories
(suppression of trauma memories, rumination
on trauma, numbing)
Response to Intrusion Questionnaire
Safety behaviours Safety Behaviour Questionnaire
Negative thoughts about self Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory
Negative thoughts about others
(overgeneralized danger)
Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory
Self-blame Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory
Perceived negative responses of others Perceived Negative Responses of Others
Perceived social support Crisis Support Scale
General psychological processing
Worry Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)
Catastrophizing Catastrophizing Interview
Negative and positive beliefs about others Brief Core Scheme Scales (BCSS)
Inter-personal sensitivity Interpersonal Sensitivity Scale (IPS)
Cognitive ﬂexibility Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS)
Anomalous experiences Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS)
Cannabis used in past month Maudsley Addiction Proﬁle (MAP)
Current psychological problems
Anxiety and depression Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS)
Insomnia Insomnia Severity Index (ISI)
PTSD, Post-traumatic stress disorder; DSM-IV, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition.
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the assault, I feel fearful of all males’, ‘Since the assault,
I feel fearful of all females’, ‘Since the assault, I feel
more fearful of other people than I should’). For
these assessments participants were reminded not
to include thoughts or feelings about the person who
recently assaulted them. We also assessed persecutory
ideation using the identical virtual reality experimental
methodology described in Freeman et al. (2008b).
Individuals spent 4min on a train ride populated by
neutral computer characters, presented using a head-
mounted display within a room where the person’s
movement could be tracked enabling a fully immersive
experience, and were then assessed for paranoid
responses using the State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS)
(Freeman et al. 2007). Because the environment is neu-
tral, any perceived hostility is known to be unfounded.
Consistent with factor-analytic and epidemiological
studies of psychotic symptoms, our conceptualization
of paranoia is that there is a hierarchy comprising
ideas of reference and of persecution. Persecutory idea-
tion, thoughts that a perpetrator is actively trying to
harm the person, typically builds upon ideas of refer-
ence that the person is being monitored or communi-
cated about (Freeman et al. 2005; Green et al. 2008).
PTSD at baseline was assessed with the self-report
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) (Foa et al. 1997)
and the interviewer version of the PTSD symptom
scale (PSSI) (Foa et al. 1993), combined with the
PTSD section of the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV (SCID; First et al. 1996) to determine whether
the symptoms had been present in the last month. We
also assessed for PTSD symptoms during the virtual
reality train ride, using a newly constructed 13-item
state self-report scale, adapted from items in existing
measures, assessing re-experiencing (e.g. ‘Upsetting
thoughts or images about the assault came into my
head when I didn’t want them to’), avoidance (e.g.
‘I tried not to think about or have feelings about the
assault’) and arousal [e.g. ‘I felt jumpy or easily startled
(for example, by sudden noises)’]. At the 3-month
follow-up we used only the GPTS (Green et al. 2008),
the paranoia visual analogue scales and the PDS
(Foa et al. 1997). At the 6-month follow-up, which
was prioritized above the 3-month assessment, we
used all the measures listed above, apart from the
virtual reality assessment. The reliability of the two
assessors (postgraduate psychologists) for the PSSI,
the PANSS positive items and the PSYRATS was
assessed using 12 audiotapes of the assessments.
The intra-class correlation coefﬁcients indicated very
high levels of reliability (PSSI=0.99, PANSS=0.92,
PSYRATS=0.99).
At baseline there were assessments of descriptive
information on the recent assault (Dunmore et al. 1999)
and factors derived from the cognitive models of
paranoia and PTSD. For factors at the time of
the trauma the Thoughts and Feelings During the
Assault scale (Halligan et al. 2002, 2003); Mental Defeat
Scale (Dunmore et al. 1999) and Cognitive Processing
Questionnaire (Halligan et al. 2002; 2003) were used.
Trauma memory was assessed with the Trauma
Memory Questionnaire (Halligan et al. 2003) and
Intrusion Qualities Questionnaire (Michael et al. 2005).
Trauma appraisals were assessed with an updated
version of the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory
(Foa et al. 1997), Perceived Negative Responses of
Others (Dunmore et al. 1999), and Interpretations of
PTSD Symptoms Inventory (Dunmore et al. 1999).
Social support was measured by the Crisis Support
Scale (Joseph, 1999). Maintaining behaviours and cogni-
tive strategies were assessed with the Safety Behaviour
Questionnaire (Dunmore et al. 1999) and Response
to Intrusions Questionnaire (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999;
Murray et al. 2002).
The additional paranoia process measures were not
tied to the trauma event but assessed affectiveprocesses,
anomalous experiences and reasoning. The affective
measures were: the Penn State Worry Questionnaire
(Meyer et al. 1990); Catastrophizing Interview (Vasey
& Borkovec, 1992); Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure
(Boyce & Parker, 1989); Brief Core Schema Scales –
other scales (Fowler et al. 2006); and the Depression
Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
Factors related to anomalous experiences were assessed
with the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (Bell et al.
2006), Insomnia Severity Index (Bastien et al. 2001) and
Maudsley Addiction Proﬁle (Marsden et al. 1998).
Reasoning style was assessed with the Cognitive
Flexibility Scale (Martin & Rubin, 1995). The socio-
economic classiﬁcation of the participants was carried
out using the occupationally based National Statistics
Socio-economic Classiﬁcation analytic classes (Ofﬁce
for National Statistics, 2005).
Statistical analysis
All analyses were carried out with Stata version 11
(StataCorp LP, USA). The ﬁrst stage of the analysis
was a description of the levels of paranoia and PTSD
in the participant group. The second stage explored
patterns of correlation between paranoia and PTSD
items using an exploratory factor analysis to look for
evidence of structure in the correlation matrix and, in
particular, evaluate whether paranoia and PTSD are
distinct experiences (at this stage it would not have
been appropriate to use a conﬁrmatory analysis). The
exploratory factor analysis (based on an initial extrac-
tion of principal components) was carried on all of
the paranoia and PTSD items. Examination of the
initial eigenvalues (through the use of a scree plot)
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was used to determine the number of factors for sub-
sequent rotation using promax and varimax algor-
ithms. In order to aid our decisions concerning the
complexity of the resulting factor structure, these
analyses were supplemented with maximum-
likelihood factor analysis runs (assuming multivariate
normality), assessing goodness of ﬁt using the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The possibilities
being examined included a single-factor solution (all
paranoia and PTSD items apparently being indicators
of a single concept), a two (or possibly more)-factor
solution but with no obviously explicable pattern of
loadings on these factors, and, again, a two (or poss-
ibly more)-factor solution with loadings being consist-
ent with prior expectations that the paranoia items, on
the whole, indicate levels of one concept (paranoia)
and PTSD items indicate another (PTSD). A further
question then related to whether the two concepts
are orthogonal (independent or uncorrelated) or non-
orthogonal (correlated).
The third stage of the analysis examined the separate
prediction of paranoia and PTSD at the 6-month
follow-up using a series of simple univariate linear
regressions. The fourth stage of the analysis examined
the differential prediction of paranoia and PTSD. For
this fourth stage, both the paranoia and PTSD scores
at the 6-month follow-up were ﬁrst standardized to
have a standard deviation equal to 1. They were then
analysed using a random-effects model (using Stata’s
XTREG command) incorporating both responses in the
model (as in a repeated-measures analysis), distin-
guished by a new variable labelled ‘type’, with type
equal to 0 for paranoia and equal to 1 for PTSD. The
aim of the analysis was to provide a test of the putative
predictor variable by type interaction (and the reason
for the prior standardization was to give the two
responses a common measurement scale, ruling out
the scale of measurement as an explanation of the
differential prediction, as tested by the interaction).
Results
Demographic details
As would be expected for a physical assault group,
there were more male participants than female (79
men and 27 women), and the mean age was relatively
young (mean age=34.4, S.D.=11.6 years). The ethnici-
ties were white (n=55), black Caribbean (n=14), black
African (n=15), black other (n=5), and other (n=17).
Most people were single (n=81), but a minority were
married (n=19) or divorced/separated (n=6). The edu-
cational qualiﬁcations obtained were: none (n=11),
GCSE (n=23), AS/A-level (n=9), diploma/foundation
degree (n=23), degree (n=26), postgraduate diploma
(n=11), and doctorate (n=3). Employment statuses
were: full time (n=47), part time (n=11), unemployed
for less than 1 year (n=18), unemployed for more
than 1 year (n=15), retired (n=1), homemaker (n=1),
and student (n=13). The distribution of the group
across socio-economic categories was: large employers
and higher managerial occupations (n=3), higher pro-
fessional occupations (n=9), lower managerial and
professional occupations (n=15), intermediate occu-
pations (n=10), small employers and own account
workers (n=11), lower supervisory and technical occu-
pations (n=6), semi-routine occupations (n=10), rou-
tine occupations (n=12), never worked and long-term
unemployed (n=15), and students (n=13).
Presence of PTSD
Mean scores on the PTSD measures at each time point
are displayed in Table 2. At baseline there was a high
correlation between the total scores for the self-report
(PDS) and interviewer-rated (PSSI) PTSD assessments
(r=0.89, p<0.001). Similarly these two measures corre-
lated highly at the ﬁnal follow-up (r=0.85, p<0.001).
Both PTSD measures at baseline correlated highly
with the measure of PTSD symptoms in virtual reality
(PSS: r=0.64, p<0.001; PDS: r=0.64, p<0.001). Over the
6 months there were signiﬁcant reductions in self-
reported and interviewer-rated PTSD symptoms
(PSSI total score: t92=5.76, p<0.001; PTDS total score:
t93=2.48, p=0.015). At baseline, 35 (33%) people met
diagnostic criteria from the SCID interviewer assess-
ment. At the 6-month assessment, 15 (16.0%) met
interviewer-rated SCID diagnostic criteria. Over the
course of the study, six participants received a psycho-
logical intervention and one participant received a
pharmacological intervention for PTSD. There was no
baseline difference in PTSD scores for the 12 people
who provided no 6-month follow-up data compared
with the rest of the sample (p=0.148).
Presence of paranoia
Mean scores on the main paranoia measures are dis-
played in Table 2. All the paranoia measures were
signiﬁcantly correlated. For example, GPTS – part A
ideas of reference correlated highly with GPTS – part
B ideas of persecution (r=0.82, p<0.001), and the
PANSS rating of suspiciousness correlated with the
GPTS total score (r=0.66, p<0.001). Those individuals
who reported paranoid thinking in virtual reality
using the SSPS reported higher scores on the paranoia
scales. For example, they reported higher GPTS – part
A ideas of reference scores (t79.5=−3.94, p<0.001),
and higher GPTS – part B persecutory ideas scores
(t77.4 =−4.05, p<0.001).
At the severe end of paranoia, on the PANSS suspi-
ciousness item at baseline, 12 people (11%) were rated
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as having moderate or moderate-severe suspiciousness.
Using the PSYRATS at baseline, 13 people (12%) held
suspicious beliefs with a level of conviction (above
50%) sufﬁcient to be considered delusional. On the
visual analogue scales at baseline almost every-
one (95%) reported some suspicious thinking, 80%
reported feeling more fearful of others than they
should, while there was unsurprisingly more fear
about men than women (see Supplementary Table S1).
This is broadly consistent with the GPTS – part B
where 68% of participants endorsed at least one of the
persecutory ideation items. This endorsement rate of
paranoid thinking is similar to that of a high-paranoia
non-clinical sample and higher than the 49% reported
for a general population sample (Freeman et al. 2010).
Over the 6 months there were no signiﬁcant
reductions in GPTS – part A (ideas of reference) or
part B (persecutory thoughts) scores or PANSS total
or suspiciousness scores (p>0.1). There were, however,
signiﬁcant reductions in three out of four of the visual
analogue scale scores: ‘I feel suspicious of other people’
(t93=6.85, p<0.001); ‘I feel more fearful of other people
than I should’ (t93=4.04, p<0.001); ‘I fear fearful of all
males’ (t93=3.96, p<0.001); ‘I feel fearful of all females’
(t93=1.69, p=0.094). There was no signiﬁcant difference
in baseline GPTS total scores between the 12 people
who provided no ﬁnal follow-up data and the rest of
the participants (p=0.537).
Relationship between paranoia and PTSD measures
There were moderate correlations between the main
paranoia and PTSD measures (see Supplementary
Table S2). Of the 13 people reporting a delusion
using the PSYRATS, 11 also received a PTSD diagnosis
using the SCID. The baseline GPTS (32 items), PSSI
(17 items), PDS (17 items), visual analogue scales
(four items) and the single PANSS suspiciousness
item were entered into a principal components analy-
sis. The ﬁrst four eigenvalues were 27.19, 7.13, 2.65
and 2.23, explaining 43, 11, 4 and 4% of the total vari-
ation, respectively. Investigation of the scree plot
(not shown) clearly indicated the existence of two
main dimensions (jointly explaining 54% of the total
variation in the data). The BIC criteria obtained
through use of maximum-likelihood factor analysis
were 6749.4, 6058.2, 6044.7 and 6136.6 when extracting
one, two, three or four factors, respectively. Here the
best-ﬁtting model is represented by the smallest
BIC. Although the three-factor solution was the opti-
mum, the two-factor solution was very close, and, in
combination with examination of the above scree
plot, we opted for the simpler two-factor solution. A
varimax rotation of the ﬁrst two principal components
was then carried out for ease of interpretation [the
two rotated factors here being constrained to be uncor-
related (i.e. independent/orthogonal), with the magni-
tude of factor loadings as close as possible to either
1 or 0]. Those items found to be loading on factor
1 (accounting for 32% of the original variation) were
the GPTS items, the PANSS suspiciousness item, and
the VAS scale ‘Since the assault I feel fearful of all
females’. Those found to be loading on factor 2
(explaining 22% of the original variation) were the
PSSI and PTDS items, and the VAS scales ‘Since the
assault I feel suspicious of other people’, ‘Since
Table 2. PTSD and paranoia scores
Measure
Baseline 3-month follow-up 6-month-follow-up
n Mean (S.D.) n Mean (S.D.) n Mean (S.D.)
PTSD
PSSI total 106 13.61 (10.39) – – 93 8.61 (9.50)
PDS total 106 16.59 (11.59) 82 16.40 (13.01) 94 13.66 (12.41)
PDS re-experiencing 106 4.92 (3.81) 82 4.56 (4.12) 94 3.78 (3.97)
PDS avoidance 106 5.77 (4.93) 82 6.12 (5.35) 94 5.03 (5.18)
PDS arousal 106 5.89 (4.42) 82 5.72 (4.71) 94 4.85 (4.41)
Paranoia
GPTS total 106 58.18 (30.01) 84 61.32 (29.18) 94 56.73 (27.93)
GPTS – part A ideas of reference 106 29.26 (13.68) 84 30.75 (13.37) 94 28.88 (13.42)
GPTS – part B persecutory ideas 106 28.92 (17.75) 84 30.57 (17.22) 94 27.85 (15.30)
PANSS positive 106 8.73 (2.70) – – 93 8.28 (2.12)
PANSS suspiciousness 106 1.77 (1.12) – – 93 1.75 (1.07)
PTSD, Post-traumatic stress disorder; S.D., standard deviation, PSSI, PTSD Symptom Scale; PDS, Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale;
GPTS, Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale; PANSS, Positive and Negative Symptom Scale.
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the assault I feel fearful of all males’ and ‘Since
the assault I feel more fearful of other people than
I should’. Rotation of the maximum-likelihood factors
led to exactly the same conclusions. An identical pat-
tern of loadings was found using a promax rotation
(which relaxes the orthogonality/independence con-
straint – allowing the resulting factors to be correlated)
– the variation explained by the two factors being
38% and 32%, respectively, but the correlation be-
tween the two promax-rotated factors being 0.53
(i.e. the contributions of the two factors should not
be added – there being about 28% of the variation in
one being explained by variability in the other).
Therefore there were clear but correlated paranoia
and PTSD factors, each comprising the main measures,
respectively, but three out of four of the visual
analogue scales did not load as expected.
Predicting the persistence of paranoia and PTSD
The ability of the individual baseline variables to pre-
dict self-reported paranoia and PTSD at the ﬁnal
follow-up assessment is reported in Table 3. There is
an extremely consistent pattern of the variables pre-
dicting both paranoia and PTSD. Of the 30 baseline
variables, 25 signiﬁcantly predicted both outcome
measures. The predictor variables were then assessed
again after controlling for the baseline score of the
dependent variable (i.e. to assess variable prediction
above initial symptom score) (see Supplementary
Table S3). Of the variables, 13 predicted paranoia,
and 10 predicted PTSD even after controlling for initial
symptom levels.
Consistent with the variables predicting both para-
noia and PTSD, there was little evidence of differential
prediction. Only three out of 30 variables differed
signiﬁcantly in their effects on paranoia and PTSD
(p<0.05) (see Supplementary Table S4): perceived
threat to life/physical integrity, characteristics of un-
wanted memories of the assault and baseline PTSD
score. An increase at baseline in all three variables
increased the likelihood of paranoia at follow-up but
increased to an even greater degree the occurrence
of PTSD.
Discussion
This is the ﬁrst study to examine concurrently paranoia
and PTSD in the months after a physical assault. While
PTSD after an assault has previously been the focus of
investigation, paranoia in reaction to the event has
not. We considered it probable that a physical assault
would skew judgements about others to the negative
and hence provide an ideal testing ground for fur-
thering the understanding of paranoid thinking. The
prevalence rates of PTSD at 1 month after the assault
were consistent with other studies, as were the
reductions over time (e.g. Halligan et al. 2003; Kleim
& Ehlers, 2008). A new ﬁnding was the notably high
level of paranoia, including simple self-reports of
being overly suspicious. For three reasons it is likely
that this level of mistrust is not simply explained by
the assessments tapping thoughts about the real per-
petrator of the assault: paranoia was equally visible
in ideas of reference, which are less likely to be directly
related to the assault event; the participants themselves
identiﬁed exaggerated and generalized fears; and the
assessments were validated against an experimental
test of paranoid thinking. Though we expected high
rates of suspicious thinking, we did not predict there
to be so little decline in these thoughts over time. It
is conceivable that some of the participants may
already have been exhibiting high levels of paranoia
before the assault (i.e. there was a selection bias,
most likely in who is assaulted); alternatively, the
results indicate that assaults have a signiﬁcant lasting
impact on trust. The visual analogue scales certainly
indicate that many of the participants believed that
the trauma raised their level of suspiciousness. If
future studies replicate this ﬁnding then routine assess-
ment of paranoia in clinical cases of PTSD may prove
to be warranted.
The high prevalence of paranoia and PTSD symp-
toms in the group provided the opportunity to
examine the predictive ability of contemporary psy-
chological models for these problems, and participants
were followed over 6 months to assess which variables
predicted the course of the disorders. This is the
strength of the research design. The results for PTSD
replicate and extend previous studies that investigated
a subset of these variables (Dunmore et al. 2001;
Halligan et al. 2003; Kleim et al. 2007; Ehring et al.
2008). Cognitive factors related to the assault predicted
the persistence of PTSD, consistent with the theoretical
model of Ehlers & Clark (2000). Predictors of PTSD
symptoms included a reliance on sensory impressions,
mental defeat and a greater perceived threat at the time
of trauma, suppression of trauma memories, rumi-
nation, safety behaviours, and ideas of the self as
damaged or at risk after the assault. A failure to
contextualize the trauma, negative appraisals of the
event, the self and others, and cognitive and behav-
ioural avoidance are plausible factors in maintaining
a current sense of threat. Many of these cognitive vari-
ables predicted over and above the initial presence of
PTSD symptoms.
The new result – and where perhaps there is the most
surprise – is the extent to which the same factors pre-
dicted levels of paranoia over time. We predicted con-
siderable overlap in the prediction of paranoia and
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Table 3. Baseline predictors of 6-month follow-up scores (unadjusted results)
Paranoia: GPTS total at 6 months PTSD: PDS total at 6 months
Coefﬁcient
Standard
coefﬁcient
(S.E.) p Coefﬁcient
Standard
coefﬁcient
(S.E.) p
The assault
Location
Close or at home
Far from home −12.35 −0.21 (6.14) 0.047* −5.03 −0.19 (2.74) 0.069
Relationship to attacker
Stranger
Known person 13.78 0.23 (5.99) 0.024* 6.38 0.24 (2.66) 0.018*
Person’s rating of severity of injuries
(0–10 scale)
3.72 0.32 (1.16) 0.002** 2.05 0.39 (0.50) <0.001***
Ongoing physical problems from assault 17.84 0.32 (5.60) 0.002** 9.15 0.36 (2.44) <0.001***
During trauma processing
Perceived threat to life/physical integrity 4.16 0.35 (1.17) 0.001** 2.62 0.49 (0.48) <0.001***
Negative emotion during trauma 1.13 0.30 (0.38) 0.004** 0.54 0.32 (0.17) 0.002**
Cognitive processing during the assault
(data-driven processing, lack of self-referent
processing and dissociation)
0.77 0.44 (0.17) <0.001*** 0.36 0.45 (0.07) <0.001***
Mental defeat 2.24 0.51 (0.40) <0.001*** 1.09 0.56 (0.17) <0.001***
Trauma memory
Memory disorganization 0.81 0.13 (0.62) 0.196 0.31 0.12 (0.28) 0.269
Characteristics of unwanted memories 0.07 0.34 (0.02) 0.001** 0.04 0.50 (0.01) <0.001***
Post-trauma responses
Cognitive responses to trauma
memories (suppression of trauma
memories, rumination on trauma, numbing)
1.30 0.47 (0.25) <0.001*** 0.72 0.59 (0.10) <0.001***
Safety behaviours 1.25 0.43 (0.27) <0.001*** 0.62 0.48 (0.12) <0.001***
Negative thoughts about self
(vulnerable self, permanent change,
alienation)
0.91 0.56 (0.14) <0.001*** 0.53 0.72 (0.05) <0.001***
Negative thoughts about others (overgeneralized
danger)
1.78 0.48 (0.33) <0.001*** 0.88 0.54 (0.14) <0.001***
Self-blame 2.08 0.42 (0.43) <0.001*** 0.98 0.48 (0.19) <0.001***
Perceived negative responses of others 2.09 0.57 (0.32) <0.001*** 0.95 0.58 (0.14) <0.001***
Perceived social support −1.30 −0.33 (0.38) 0.001** −0.71 −0.41 (0.16) <0.001***
General psychological processing
Worry (PSWQ) 0.78 0.39 (0.19) <0.001*** 0.33 0.37 (0.09) <0.001***
Catastrophizing 0.98 0.14 (0.73) 0.182 0.10 0.03 (0.33) 0.754
Negative beliefs about others (BCSS) 1.95 0.46 (0.39) <0.001*** 0.73 0.39 (0.18) <0.001***
Positive beliefs about others (BCSS) −0.63 −0.13 (0.48) 0.197 −0.19 −0.09 (0.22) 0.385
Inter-personal sensitivity 1.97 0.42 (0.72) 0.007** 0.64 0.36 (0.32) 0.052
Cognitive ﬂexibility −1.43 −0.43 (0.31) <0.001*** −0.55 −0.37 (0.14) <0.001***
Anomalous experiences (CAPS) 2.14 0.50 (0.38) <0.001*** 0.79 0.42 (0.18) <0.001***
Cannabis used in past month 7.52 0.13 (6.22) 0.230 2.49 0.09 (2.77) 0.372
Current psychological problems
Anxiety 1.54 0.53 (0.26) <0.001*** 0.78 0.61 (0.11) <0.001***
Depression 1.48 0.54 (0.24) <0.001*** 0.75 0.62 (0.10) <0.001***
Insomnia 1.77 0.46 (0.36) <0.001*** 0.86 0.50 (0.16) <0.001***
Paranoia (GPTS total) 0.66 0.71 (0.07) <0.001*** 0.25 0.59 (0.04) <0.001***
PTSD (PDS total) 1.33 0.53 (0.22) <0.001*** 0.78 0.70 (0.08) <0.001***
GPTS, Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder; PDS, Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale;
S.E., standard error; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BCSS, Brief Core Schema Scale; CAPS, Cardiff Anomalous
Perceptions Scale.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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PTSD since both concern perceptions of ongoing threat
but also expected a degree of difference. Instead we
showed that processing style in relation to the assault
and its aftermath was similarly linked to the persistence
of paranoia. The cognitive factors identiﬁed from PTSD
work as resulting in maladaptive responses to trauma
may provide a framework to assess negative events
in relation to persecutory ideas. It is notable also that
being attacked close to home, and by people known to
the person, were associated with greater paranoia over
time, indicating perhaps the more corrosive nature of
attack in places and with people thought previously
safe or trustworthy. The close links longitudinally
between paranoia, anxiety, worry, depression and
insomnia replicate ﬁndings in the general population
(Freeman et al. 2012). Although by necessity there was
considerable statistical testing in the prediction of
levels of paranoia and PTSD, the pattern of ﬁndings
was very clear.
Levels of paranoia and PTSD were moderately corre-
lated, but the factor analyses indicated that paranoia
and PTSD are distinct experiences. Each therefore
needs to be explained. This led to our analysis of differ-
ential predictors. Even given our expected close con-
nections between PTSD and paranoia, it was quite
striking that only two cognitive variables related
differently to the experiences. Indeed, given the mul-
tiple testing, the probability values obtained, and the
absence of a priori prediction for the signiﬁcant vari-
ables, we are probably simply observing type I error.
Even initial paranoia scores did not differentially pre-
dict levels of later paranoia. Our judgement is that a
larger sample size is needed to more rigorously evalu-
ate the potential cognitive differences and hence test
the two theoretical models speciﬁcity. However, there
may also be measurement difﬁculties, especially for
anomalous experiences where the theoretical import
resides in the absence of clear conscious awareness,
thus limiting self-report assessment. Nonetheless, we
did not replicate two studies that showed that anoma-
lous experiences are speciﬁc to paranoia, in that such
anomalies differentially predicted paranoia from social
anxiety (Freeman et al. 2005, 2008a). This might be
explained by the current study investigating PTSD
rather than social anxiety. In PTSD dissociation is
common (e.g. Briere et al. 2005), and this includes
a wide variety of anomalous perceptual experiences
(e.g. Sierra et al. 2005). The central and clear ﬁnding
is the near absence of detection of factors that differen-
tiate paranoia and PTSD, which is in contrast to the
clear pattern of results showing the cognitive variables
predicting both experiences.
The study has a number of important limitations.
Foremost, due to the study design, it cannot be deter-
mined that the assault led to an increase in paranoia.
It is likely that this could only be researched in a
natural experiment. The visual analogue questions
certainly indicated that the majority of the participants
viewed the assault as raising their levels of suspicious-
ness, but this is a retrospective evaluation. In the cur-
rent study it may have been helpful to have had an
earlier assessment of symptom levels and cognitive
processing, perhaps in the ﬁrst few days after the
assault. Corroboration of changes in the individuals’
behaviours after the assault, particularly in trust, by
those close to the person may have been revealing,
and added to the variety of methods employed in the
current study. The interpretation of the results is
clearly strongest for the longitudinal element of the
study. It is notable that the sample studied was a
small proportion of those potentially eligible, indicat-
ing sampling bias. During the 12 months of the study
we recorded the recruitment process in detail, and con-
sider the low recruitment rate to be a reﬂection of the
general difﬁculties of engaging people after a signiﬁ-
cant physical assault, which is clearly illustrated by
many of the emergency department attendees giving
incorrect contact details to the hospital. Nonetheless,
the demographic proﬁle of the group and the PTSD
results closely mirror those found in past studies (e.g.
Kleim et al. 2008), indicating that a typical sample is
likely to have been recruited. It is also important to
note that a recruitment of a greater number of partici-
pants would have enhanced the ability to detect differ-
ential predictors. A large number of statistical tests
were carried out because this was the ﬁrst test of the
hypotheses and therefore we were most interested in
individual scale results. Another valid approach, mini-
mizing the statistical testing, would be to identify a
smaller number of clusters of factors and examine
their predictive ability. Nonetheless, the overall pattern
of results is strikingly clear. A different but strong
research design for future studies would be to manip-
ulate the cognitive variables of interest and examine
the impact on reactions to an assault (Kendler &
Campbell, 2009). One way of initially looking at this
approach, using existing datasets, would be to see
whether psychological treatments for PTSD have also
led to a lowering of levels of mistrust, as the results
of the study would imply. The study has shown a
close proximity between paranoia and PTSD but also
left a signiﬁcant question unanswered: what are the
factors determining speciﬁcally paranoid rather than
PTSD responses to a trauma (and vice versa)?
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